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“Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments known the components of liberty in 
its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.  They did 
not presume to have this insight.  They knew times can blind us to 
certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.  As the Constitution 
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their 
own search for greater freedom.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As we enter 2011, progress on marijuana law reform in the U.S. is 
mixed.  At the state level, on the one hand, there is momentum.  
Following California’s lead in 1996, fifteen states now allow the 
medicinal use of marijuana.2  As for recreational use, although 
California recently rejected Proposition 19 by a 54% to 46% margin,3 
this ballot initiative thrust the issue to the forefront of national and 
international political debate.4  Indeed, plans are already underway to 
place similar yet refined measures on state ballots in 2012.5  As Richard 
Lee, founder of Oaksterdam University and author of Proposition 19, 
thus remarked, “over the course of the last year, it has become clear that 
 
 1. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). 
 2. Devlin Houser, Arizona Narrowly Approves Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2010. 
 3. See John Hoeffel & Maria L. LaGanga, Youth Vote Falters; Prop. 19 Falls Short, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010.  Proposition 19, the “Regulate, Control, and Tax Cannabis Act of 
2010,” would have changed California law from a regime of marijuana prohibition to one of 
marijuana regulation and taxation. 
 4. See, e.g., Joe Klein, It’s High Time, TIME, Apr. 13, 2009, at 19; Timothy Egan, Reefer 
Gladness, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2010; Jeffrey A. Miron, Drugs and Conservatives Should Go 
Together, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 29, 2010; George Soros, Why I Support Legal Marijuana, 
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 26, 2010; Ed Kilgore, Fired Up? THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 26, 2010; 
Nicholas D. Kristof, End the War on Pot, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2010; High Time to Legalise 
Marijuana; Californians Should back Proposition 19, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Oct. 28, 2010; 
Andrew Ferguson, How Marijuana Got Mainstreamed, TIME, Nov. 22, 2010, at 30.  As one 
journalist writes, “polls indicate Prop. 19 is by far the most recognizable measure on the ballot. It’s 
also been drawing international headlines because it would make California the first place in the 
United States to legalize recreational pot.” Kevin Fagan, Prop. 19: Fight over Pot Starts to Heat 
Up, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Oct. 24, 2010.  
 5. See Stephen Gutwillig, History is on Proposition 19’s Side, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Nov.3, 
2010; Henry K. Lee, Legal Pot Backers Vow to Try Again in 2012, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 
Nov. 4, 2010; Kevin Fagan, Defeat of Pot Measure Shows Divide Lingers, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, Nov. 7, 2010, and www.mpp.org. 
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the legalization of marijuana is no longer a question of if but a question 
of when.”6 
Notwithstanding such momentum at the state level, however, the 
prospects for reform at the federal level appear dismal for the near 
future.  For its part, Congress has consistently refused even to instruct 
the DEA not to harass sick patients in states with medical marijuana 
laws.7  For his part, President Obama has sent mixed signals on 
marijuana policy.  On the one hand, he announced in 2009 that so long 
as state medical marijuana laws are faithfully observed, there would be 
no DEA intervention.8  In 2010, by contrast, when polls leading up to the 
election indicated that Proposition 19 might succeed, Attorney General 
Eric Holder threatened to enforce federal marijuana prohibition if it did.9 
With Proposition 19’s defeat, of course, the Administration dodged 
a bullet.  Yet Obama almost certainly seeks reelection, and few 
politicians of either party will touch the marijuana issue.10  Especially 
since the new Republican-controlled House of Representatives is even 
less likely to spur reform in this area than did the recent Democrat-
controlled House, it seems clear that for the time being, federal 
marijuana prohibition11 marches on. 
If Obama is reelected, however, the situation transforms.  Since the 
Twenty-second Amendment bars him from a third term,12 and his future 
would be quite secure, he would be free to speak the truth on this issue, 
which includes the following: beyond its economic13 and social14 costs, 
 
 6. Kevin Fagan, ‘Resounding’ Rejection for Marijuana Measure, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, Nov. 3, 2010; See also Ethan Nadelmann, Marijuana Legalization: Not If, But When, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 3, 2010. 
 7. See, e.g., Hinchey Encouraged by Record House Support for Medical Marijuana; Vows to 
Keep Fighting for Amendment, STATES NEWS SERVICE, July 25, 2007. 
 8. See David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Obama Administration to Stop Raids on Medical 
Marijuana Dispensers, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009. 
 9. See Adam Nagourney, U.S. Will Enforce Marijuana Laws, State Vote Aside, N. Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 15, 2010, The Feds Say No Way, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010, and The Feds Weigh in 
on Proposition 19, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Oct. 27, 2010, at A15. 
 10. None of those who ran for Governor of California in 2010, for example, supported 
Proposition 19.  See Bob Egelko, Legal Pot a Tough Sell in (2010 California Gubernatorial) Race, 
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Aug. 8, 2009 and Joe Garofoli, Bid to Legalize Pot is Counter to U.S. 
Trend, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 5, 2010. 
 11. The statutory basis of this prohibition, enacted in 1970, is the Comprehensive Drug 
Prevention and Control Act, popularly called the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 - 904 
(2009). The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) classifies marijuana as a Schedule One controlled 
substance, which means that in Congress’ view, it has a high potential for abuse, no officially 
accepted medicinal uses, and no safe level of use under medical supervision. 
 12. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. 
 13. As a single illustration, in a report signed by over 500 economists, including three Nobel 
Laureates, Harvard economist Jeffrey Miron estimated that ending cannabis prohibition would save 
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marijuana prohibition burdens a range of constitutional interests, 
including those arising under the First,15 Fourth,16 Fifth,17 Sixth,18 
 
$7.7 billion per year in government expenditures on its enforcement ($5.3 billion accruing to State 
and local governments, while $2.4 billion accruing to the U.S. government).  He also estimated that 
ending the prohibition would yield tax revenue of $2.4 billion annually if cannabis were taxed like 
all other goods and $6.2 billion annually if it were taxed at rates comparable to those on alcohol and 
tobacco.  Jeffrey A. Miron, The Budgetary Implications of Marijuana Prohibition (June 2005), 
http://www.prohibitioncosts.org/endorsers.html. 
 14. The rule of law and the legitimacy of the criminal justice system are undermined, for 
example, when government promulgates misleading propaganda to justify the enforcement of 
widely ignored laws.  See generally, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.DEA.gov (last visited Sept. 17, 2010) and OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
POLICY, http://www.ONDCP.gov (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).  Moreover, the black market in 
marijuana generates vast profits which make the violent gangs that control that market attractive to 
young people.  It also gives public officials, with their typically modest salaries, incentives to 
cooperate with the underground market.  Beyond this, families and individual lives are destroyed 
when nonviolent cannabis offenders are thrust into a world of prison gangs, sexual violence, hard 
drugs, and learned criminality.  These problems are worsened by prison overcrowding, which forces 
the early release of violent offenders to make room for nonviolent ones.  And perhaps the most 
tragic social cost of this prohibition is that it is largely a war on racial minorities.  It is well 
documented that the U.S. has the world’s highest prison population rate, that it has widely 
disproportionate felony conviction and incarceration rates by race, and that the picture is even worse 
for minorities with respect to drug crimes in particular.  See generally JUDGE RUDOLPH J. GERBER, 
LEGALIZING MARIJUANA: DRUG POLICY REFORM AND PROHIBITION POLITICS (2004); JOEL 
MILLER, BAD TRIP: HOW THE WAR AGAINST DRUGS IS DESTROYING AMERICA (2004); ERIC 
SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS: SEX, DRUGS, AND CHEAP LABOR IN THE AMERICAN BLACK 
MARKET (2003); JUDGE JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE 
CAN DO ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS (2001);  William F. Buckley, 
Mayor Kurt Schmoke, & Police Chief Joseph McNamara, The War on Drugs is Lost, in MIKE 
GRAY, BUSTED 198-209 (2002) [hereinafter, M. GRAY I].  
 15. As for freedom of speech, see Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Gerber, supra note 14, at 121-30, and Graham Boyd & Jack Hitt, This is Your Bill of Rights, in M. 
GRAY I, supra note 14, at 149.  As for religious freedom, it has been argued that since adult 
marijuana use promotes spiritual centering and insight, it should be protected under the free exercise 
clause. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Mallan, 86 HAW. 440, 444 (1998); Jacob Sullum, Spiritual Highs and 
Legal Blows:  The Power and Peril of Religious Exemptions from Drug Prohibition, in REASON, 
June 2007, at 43-54, available at http://reason.com/news/show/119721.html; Empt. Div. v. Smith, 
485 U.S. 660 (1988), however, held that the drug war trumps free exercise. 
 16. See, e.g., Thomas Regnier, The “Loyal Foot Soldier”: Can the Fourth Amendment 
Survive the Supreme Court’s War on Drugs?, 72 UMKC L. REV. 631 (2004); Frank Rudy Cooper, 
The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling, and 
Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851 (2002); Dave Kopel, Smash-up Policing: When Law Enforcement 
Goes Military, in M. GRAY I, supra note 14, at 155-58 (militarization of law enforcement); Jim 
Dwyer, Casualty in the War on Drugs, in M. GRAY I, supra note 14, at 159-63 (distortion of police 
practices). 
 17. The widely used practice of civil asset forfeiture in drug cases, for example, presents 
questions under the Double Jeopardy Clause, see United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 270 (1996), 
and the Takings Clause, see Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 443 (1996).  See also Boyd & Hitt, 
supra note 15, at 151-52. 
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Eighth,19 Tenth,20 and Fifteenth21 Amendments.22  As a constitutional 
lawyer, further, the President knows that these problems may be but 
symptoms of an underlying constitutional infirmity, one rooted primarily 
in the Fourteenth Amendment.  This article is written to help clarify the 
full range of understanding Obama would bring to a second term.  
Specifically, I defend two related, contested theses. 
My core thesis, to which this article is primarily devoted, is a 
jurisprudential claim:  contrary to state and lower federal court rulings, 
marijuana prohibition is subject to strict judicial scrutiny under leading 
 
 18. The use of anonymous informants in drug cases, for example, undermines the right to 
confront one’s accusers. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Boyd & Hitt, supra note 
15, at 152.   
 19. Mandatory minimum sentences for possession or sale undermine the proportionality of 
punishment to offense, raising an issue of cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., United States v. 
Strahan, 565 F.3d 1047, 1053 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. O’Dell, 320 F.3d 674, 678 (6th Cir., 
2003); Boyd and Hitt, supra note  15, at 152-53; but see Linda Greenhouse, Justice Restore Judges’ 
Control over Sentencing, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007, at A1. 
 20. In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), the Court held that Congress’ commerce power 
trumps the traditional police power of States, rooted in the Tenth Amendment, to regulate intrastate 
activity for the health and welfare of their citizens.  See generally Martin D. Carcieri, Gonzales v. 
Raich: Congressional Tyranny and Irrelevance in the War on Drugs, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1131 
(2007); Ilya Slomin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507 (2006); Alex Kreit, The Future of Medical Marijuana: Should the 
States Grow Their Own?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1793-1800 (2003). 
 21. The Fifteenth Amendment guarantees voting rights regardless of race, yet “[t]hirteen 
percent of all adult black men—1.4 million—are disenfranchised, representing one-third of the total 
disenfranchised population and reflecting a rate of disenfranchisement that is seven times the 
national average.  Election voting statistics offer an approximation of the political importance of 
black disenfranchisement: 1.4 million black men are disenfranchised compared to 4.6 million black 
men who voted in 1996.”  Jamie Fellner & Marc Mauer, Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony 
Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, 8 (Human Rights Watch & The Sentencing Project, 
1998). 
 22. These arguments have been made elsewhere.  Beyond the sources already referenced. See, 
e.g., Norm Stamper, America’s Drug War and the Right to Privacy, 68 MONT. L. REV. 285 (2007); 
Andrew Koppelman, Drug Policy and the Liberal Self, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 279 (2006); Gerald G. 
Ashdown, The Blueing of America: The Bridge Between the War on Drugs and the War on 
Terrorism, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 753 (2006); Roger Pilon, Tenants, Students, and Drugs: A Comment 
on the War on the Rule of Law, CATO, http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2002/pilon.pdf; Erik Luna, 
Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753 (2002); Steven Duke, The Drug War and the 
Constitution in AFTER PROHIBITION: AN ADULT APPROACH TO DRUG POLICIES IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 41-59 (Timothy Lynch ed., 2000); Robert Sweet & Edward Harris, Moral and 
Constitutional Considerations in Support of the Decriminalization of Drugs, in HOW TO LEGALIZE 
DRUGS 430-84 (Jefferson M. Fish ed., 1998); David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on 
Procedural Fairness and Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237, 245 (1994); Paul Finkelman, 
The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL L. REV. 1389, 1399 
(1993); Dan Baumann, The Drug War and Civil Liberties, THE NATION, June 29, 1992; Steven 
Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging “Drug Exception” to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 
889 (1987).  
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relevant U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.23  I support this thesis 
primarily by showing that under the Fourteenth Amendment, bodily 
autonomy—i.e., the control over the borders and contents of one’s body 
burdened by laws like marijuana prohibition—is a fundamental right, 
and that the Court has thus established a presumption in its favor, 
especially for adults in the home.  I then reinforce this thesis with three 
further arguments:  (1) marijuana prohibition violates “justice as 
regularity,”24 (2) marijuana prohibition satisfies the “suspect class” 
trigger of strict scrutiny,25 and (3) bodily autonomy is closely analogous 
to the fundamental right of free speech.  In sum, I argue that all roads of 
constitutional analysis lead to strict scrutiny of marijuana prohibition. 
My second thesis, resting largely on the first, is a policy claim: if 
reelected, Obama will be inclined, and ought, to urge Congress to end 
federal marijuana prohibition, letting States go their own way within 
federal guidelines.26  As President, he knows that if he is convinced, on 
both policy and constitutional grounds, that the law must be changed, he 
need not wait for the Court to act—or more accurately, react.  Especially 
if the current pace of state marijuana law reform continues through 2012, 
Obama’s recommendation will have broad support by the time he 
delivers his 2013 State of the Union address. 
An application of strict scrutiny to marijuana prohibition is the 
subject of another article.  Here I simply show that the President has 
ample reason under well-settled law to conclude that this prohibition is 
properly subject to that high standard.  It may be that prohibition of 
cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine could survive strict scrutiny.  
These too are the subjects of other articles.  Obama takes the rule of law 
seriously, however, and he would have grave doubts that marijuana 
prohibition could pass an honest application of strict scrutiny, in turn 
prompting him to urge Congress to end this costly war. 
 
 23. The meaning and significance of strict scrutiny will be presented below. 
 24. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 207-08 (Rev. Ed. 1999) [hereinafter TJ]. 
 25. The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the precise question of whether 
marijuana prohibition is subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment by virtue of 
burdening the fundamental right of bodily autonomy.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 2, 32. (2005) focuses on 
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause to preempt contrary state marijuana laws, and United 
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 494-95 (2001) is a statutory 
interpretation of the CSA. 
 26. This would require removing marijuana from Schedule One of the CSA and could include 
such federal restrictions on state law as bans on advertising of marijuana, sale to children, driving 
under the influence of marijuana, public use of marijuana, etc. 
6
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II.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF BODILY AUTONOMY 
A. Introduction 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “no State . . . shall 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”27  The President has written that he considers these provisions 
to be among the Constitution’s most important.28  He knows, after all, 
that civil liberty is ultimately fused with equality—that where the law 
creates a presumption of liberty, each person has a vital interest in not 
having his liberty denied while others are allowed an equal or more 
harmful liberty.29  As Professor Tribe thus recently observed, substantive 
due process “is a narrative in which due process and equal protection, far 
from having separate missions and entailing different inquiries, are 
profoundly interlocked in a legal double helix. It is a single, unfolding 
tale of equal liberty . . . .”30  
In this light, it is not surprising that due process and equal 
protection analyses blend into each other.  Both start with the premise 
that one challenging a law as an unconstitutional violation of his rights 
ordinarily has the presumption against him.  So long as government can 
show a legitimate interest or end in enacting the law, that is, that the law 
 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend.  XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 28. See BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 90 (2006). 
 29. TJ, supra note 24, at 209. 
 30. Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak its 
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004). This view is confluent with that of Rawls, whose 
equal liberty principle is the fundamental norm of a just constitution.  See TJ, supra note 24, at 53. 
Given the stature and legitimacy of Rawls’ work, I shall draw upon it at several points. I should thus 
say briefly why I think the President would be receptive to guidance from Rawls. Obama is a 
lawyer, to begin, steeped in the law of contracts.  His view of a vibrant social contract as the 
essential foundation for political rights and obligations in a just society is thus not surprising.  While 
the strengths of utilitarianism and intuitionism are plain for the President to see, further, he can also 
easily grasp their fatal limitations as overarching principles of justice.  Given his command of the 
sources and structure of American law—the relationship among foundational principles, a 
constitution, statutory law, judicial and administrative decision making—he would find the four 
stage sequence and lexical ordering of the principles of justice valuable tools that invite application 
of those principles to concrete policy, legal, and constitutional problems.  As a Democrat on the 
moderate political left, further, Obama embraces principles of equal liberty and fair equality of 
opportunity, rejecting conservative and libertarian claims that mere formal equality of opportunity 
yields a just and stable social order.  As for the difference principle, finally, not only do Obama’s 
speeches, writings, and lawmaking efforts evince a genuine concern for the least advantaged of all 
races, but his life story exemplifies the fact, underscored by Rawls, that least advantaged status is no 
mere function of race.  See generally TJ, supra note 24; JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS:  A 
RESTATEMENT (2001) [hereinafter, JF]; see also JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, READING OBAMA:  
DREAMS, HOPES, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 89-110 (2011). 
7
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is “rationally related” to advancing that interest, it will be upheld.  This 
ends/means test, embodying a presumption for government and against 
the individual, is called rational basis scrutiny.31  
In some cases, however, the Court has found either that the right 
burdened by a challenged law is “fundamental”32 or that a classification 
the law employs is “suspect.”33  In either case, it applies “strict 
scrutiny,”34 and the presumption shifts to favor the individual.35  While 
the law might still survive constitutional challenge, government now has 
an uphill battle: it needs not simply a legitimate interest in enacting the 
law, but a compelling one.36  It must have, we might say, not just a 
reason, but a very good reason.  Further, the law as a means must be not 
just rationally related to advancing the interest, but “narrowly tailored” 
to doing so.37  There must be not just a plausible link between means and 
ends, in other words, but a close, efficient, causal link—one that is 
neither too over-inclusive nor under-inclusive.38  On both the ends and 
 
 31. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79  (1911); United States 
R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980); WILLIAM COHEN, DAVID DANELSKI, & DAVID A. 
YALOF, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  CIVIL RIGHTS AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 984 (6th ed. 2007).  
This general presumption in favor of the constitutionality of governmental action, it must be 
observed, is at it must be.  If government did not usually enjoy this presumption, the political 
branches could be brought to a standstill by litigation forcing them to defend all their actions under 
strict scrutiny.  In effect, this would be government by judiciary, which is antithetical to the 
republican government the U.S. Constitution creates. 
 32. The seminal case is United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938).  
Since then, the Court has recognized as fundamental such interests as marriage and procreation, 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); voting, Harper v. Virgina State Bd. of Elections, 383 
U.S. 663, 670 (1966); and interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). 
 33. The quintessential suspect classification the Court has recognized, also rooted in United 
States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4  (1938), is race.  See, e.g., Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9, 11 (1967).  Beginning in the 
1970’s the Court developed intermediate scrutiny to test gender classifications, which were 
considered “quasi-suspect.”  See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 34. Justice Douglas introduced this term in Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
 35. William Cohen, David Danelski, & David A. Yalof, Constitutional Law: Civil Rights and 
Individual Liberties 984-85 (6th ed. 2007). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Johnson v. Cal., 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2752 (2007). 
 38. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 n.39 (1979); 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 207 (2003); Cuellar v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 1994, 2004 (2008).  
Legislative means are underinclusive with regard to legislative ends where they fail to include 
within their reach activity that threatens those ends.  They are overinclusive, conversely, where they 
include within their reach activity that does not threaten those ends.  Government being imperfect 
by definition, the fit between ends and means could never, and need never, be perfect.  Where strict 
scrutiny applies, however, there is far less tolerance for overinclusion and underinclusion than under 
intermediate or rational basis scrutiny.  See generally, Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and 
Underinclusion:  A New Model, 36 UCLA L. REV. 447 (1989). 
8
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means portions of the analysis, a court applying strict scrutiny is 
skeptical of, not deferential to, government’s arguments.39 
B. Core Thesis:  Bodily Autonomy and the Fourteenth Amendment 
1.  Bodily Autonomy as a Fundamental Right 
Since the 1980’s, writes Professor Post, the Court has developed 
two approaches to identifying fundamental rights in its substantive due 
process jurisprudence—the traditional approach and the autonomy 
approach.40  The former is drawn originally from Palko v. Connecticut41 
and embodied more recently in Washington v. Glucksberg.42  Beyond the 
rule that an asserted fundamental right must be “deeply rooted in the 
Nation’s history and tradition” as well as “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty,” Glucksberg demands a “careful description” of the 
right.43   Relying on this traditional formulation, state courts and lower 
federal courts have long held that laws criminalizing the possession or 
use of marijuana, even by adults in private, burden no fundamental right, 
and so need only pass rational basis scrutiny.44  As the Hawaii Supreme 
Court has written, for example, 
We cannot say that smoking marijuana is a part of the “traditions and 
collective conscience of our people.”  In Hawai’i, possession of 
marijuana has been illegal since 1931 . . . . In the rest of the United 
States, the possession and/or use of marijuana, even in small quantities, 
is almost universally prohibited.  Therefore, tradition appears to be in 
favor of the prohibition against possession and use of marijuana . . . . 
Furthermore, we cannot say that the principles of liberty and justice 
underlying our civil and political institutions are violated by marijuana 
possession laws.  We dare say that liberty and justice can exist in spite 
 
 39. See generally Craig R. Ducat, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:  POWERS OF 
GOVERNMENT 86-89 (9th ed. 2009). Nonetheless, to be clear, government sometimes prevails even 
under strict scrutiny.  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319 (2003).  
 40.  See Robert Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Foreword:  Fashioning the Legal 
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 89 (2003). 
 41. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
 42. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 43. Id. at 721. 
 44. See, e.g., Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (2007); Hawaii v. Sunderland, 115 Haw. 
396, 409 (2007) (Moon, C.J., concurring and dissenting); Seeley v. Washington, 132 Wn.2d 776, 
792 (1997); United States v. Fogarty, 692 F.2d 542, 547 (1982); NORML v. Bell, 488 F.Supp. 123, 
134 (1980); Washington v. Smith, 93 Wn.2d 329, 336 (1980); Hamilton v. Florida, 366 So.2d 8, 10 
(1978). A few state opinions have held marijuana prohibition unconstitutional, yet they either relied 
on state constitutional privacy clauses or applied rational basis scrutiny in order to do so.  See, e.g., 
Ravin v. Alaska, 537 P.2d 494 (1975); People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91 (1972).   
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of the prohibition against marijuana possession.  Therefore, the 
purported right to possess and use marijuana is not a fundamental 
right and a compelling state interest is not required.”45 
This conclusion, I submit, cannot withstand analysis.  To see why, 
we must evaluate bodily autonomy as a fundamental right under both 
approaches identified by Post. 
To begin, the phrases “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”46 
and “neither justice nor liberty would exist if they were sacrificed”47 are 
vague and abstract, and so provide little real guidance.  They draw us out 
onto Wittgenstein’s slippery ice, where language has little traction.48  At 
best, they yield starting points for analysis.  While a High Court may 
“dare say that liberty and justice can exist in spite of (marijuana) 
prohibition,”49 then, this is a meaningless claim that can be neither 
proven nor disproven without heavy theoretical lifting.  Reasonable 
people differ on the meaning of such terms, so we are entitled to know 
exactly how liberty can truly exist where the state can invade adults’ 
bodily autonomy, even in the home.  We are entitled to know how 
justice can really exist when adults who privately consume marijuana are 
criminals while adults who consume far more dangerous substances like 
alcohol and tobacco, even in public, are within their rights for reasons 
that are widely understood.50  The Mallan court does not remotely speak 
to such questions. 
 
 45. Hawaii v. Mallan, 86 Haw. 440, 445-46 (1998) (emphasis added).  
 46. Id. at 443. 
 47. Id. at 444. 
 48. As he famously wrote, 
it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up … and not go astray and imagine that we 
have to describe extreme subtleties, which in turn we are after all quite unable to 
describe with the means at our disposal.  We feel as if we had to repair a torn spider’s 
web with our fingers…. The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper 
becomes the conflict between it and our requirement…. We have got on to slippery ice 
where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just 
because of that, we are unable to walk.  We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to 
the rough ground! 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS I 39-40 (2001).  
 49.  Mallan, 86 Haw. at 445. 
 50. It is widely understood, for example, that in a free society adults must presumptively be 
free to consume what they wish, and that U.S. Prohibition was repealed as a constitutional and 
policy failure.  Beyond this, several authorities and leading studies declare that marijuana is far less 
harmful than alcohol and tobacco.  As one concluded, “[a]n objective consideration of marijuana 
shows that it is responsible for less damage to the individual and society than are alcohol and 
cigarettes.”  Twentieth Annual Report of the Research Advisory Panel, California Research 
Advisory Panel, 1989, http://www.norml.org. According to an article in The Lancet, a leading 
British medical journal, “The smoking of cannabis, even long-term, is not harmful to health . . . .  It 
would be reasonable to judge cannabis as less of a threat . . . than alcohol or tobacco.”  
10
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By contrast, the other aspect of the first prong of the traditional 
approach—whether a right is “so rooted in the traditions and conscience 
 
Deglamorising Cannabis, 346 THE LANCET, Nov. 14, 1995, at 1241; a study recently commissioned 
by the U.S. government concluded that “users of marijuana are less likely to become dependent on 
the drug in comparison to alcohol and nicotine.”  Janet E. Joy, Stanley J. Watson, Jr., & John A 
Benson, Jr., Marijuana and Medicine: Assessing the Science Base, DIVISION OF NEUROSCIENCE 
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE 98 (1999). See also ERIC GOODE, BETWEEN 
POLITICS AND REASON: THE DRUG LEGALIZATION DEBATE 155 (1997); Schlosser, supra note 14, at 
74. Indeed, “[d]espite its use by millions of people over thousands of years, cannabis has never 
caused a death.”  Lester Grinspoon, Cannabis, the Wonder Drug, in THE DRUG LEGALIZATION 
DEBATE 101-02 (James A. Inciardi, ed., 1999).  By contrast, alcohol related deaths total more than 
100,000 per year, and tobacco causes more than 400,000 U.S. deaths each year.  See J.M. McGinnis 
& W. H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the United States, in 270 JAMA 2207, 2207-12 (1993); 
Ting-Kai Li, M.D., Alcohol Use Disorders and Co-Occurring Conditions, THE NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE (last viewed Dec. 7, 2010),  
http://archives.drugabuse.gov/meetings/ccc/plenary2.html; Glen R. Hanson, NIDA Acting Director, 
NIDA's Continued Commitment, THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE (last viewed Dec. 7, 
2010),  http://archives.drugabuse.gov/NIDA_notes/NNVol17N6/DirRepVol17N6.html.  Thus, 
“[t]hough cannabis use is not without harm, especially for adolescents, as a source of danger it is 
certainly trumped by alcohol, tobacco, reckless driving, criminality, and unsafe sexual behavior . . . .  
This begs the question: why not remove the inconsistency by changing the pot laws?”  ROBERT J. 
MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES 345, 358 (2001).  Beyond this, there is 
evidence that marijuana is less dangerous than caffeine or fatty foods.  As for coffee, one writer 
observes that “the risks of caffeine are greater than THC in every way . . . .  Caffeine is physically 
addicting (with headache as the most often cited symptom) and can cause unnecessary stress, 
lightheadedness, breathlessness, and an irregular heartbeat or much worse in larger-than-average 
doses.  Marijuana isn’t even remotely as dangerous—no deaths by overdose, no physical addiction, 
and minimal health risks . . . .”  Gable, in Fish, ed., supra note 22, at 406 (quoting D. Larsen).  As 
Gore and Earleywine write, further, “cannabis appears to have little addictive potential in the 
opinion of most experts, particularly when compared to other common drugs, including caffeine.”  
Robert Gore & Mitch Earleywine, Marijuana’s Perceived Addictiveness:  A Survey of Clinicians 
and Researchers, in POT POLITICS: MARIJUANA AND THE COSTS OF PROHIBITION 185 (Mitch 
Earleywine, ed., 2007).  As for fatty foods, “in March, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention predicted that obesity will overtake smoking as the leading cause of preventable deaths 
in the United States by next year if current trends continue.”  Rashad & Michael Grossman, The 
Economics of Obesity, 156 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 104.  As Husak notes, “[P]eople overeat and grow 
obese, their health suffers, they may die prematurely.  None of this is good . . . .  What should be 
done about it?  What about criminalizing it? . . .  This is crazy . . . .  The problem is not large 
enough to warrant such extreme infringements of liberty.”  DOUGLAS HUSAK, LEGALIZE THIS!  THE 
CASE FOR LEGALIZING DRUGS vii-viii (2002).  In sum, since 1969, government-appointed 
commissions in the United States, Canada, England, Australia, and the Netherlands concluded, after 
reviewing the scientific evidence, that marijuana’s dangers had previously been greatly exaggerated, 
and urged lawmakers to drastically reduce or eliminate penalties for marijuana possession.  See 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON DRUG DEPENDENCE, CANNABIS (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 
1969); CANADIAN GOVERNMENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, THE NON-MEDICAL USE OF DRUGS 
(Information Canada 1970); MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING, THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE (Nixon-Shafer Report) (GPO 1972); WERKGROEP 
VERDOVENDE MIDDELEN, BACKGROUND AND RISKS OF DRUG USE (Staatsuigeverij 1972); DRUG 
PROBLEMS IN AUSTRALIA-AN INTOXICATED SOCIETY, SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL 
WELFARE (Australian Government Publishing Service 1977). 
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of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”51—provides some 
guidance.  Sometimes, after all, we can justifiably claim that a given 
right is embedded in American traditions and conscience.  Indeed, bodily 
autonomy is a good example.  Beyond its reflection in the Fourth 
Amendment,52 leading Anglo-American political theory,53 and the 
statutory law of alcohol, tobacco, caffeine, and fatty foods, “a right of 
control over one’s body has deep roots in the common law.”54  As the 
Supreme Court observed over a century ago, “no right is held more 
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right 
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free 
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and 
unquestionable authority of law.”55  As Justice Cardozo later wrote, 
“[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body.”56  Under the 
“historical roots” aspect of the traditional approach, then, bodily 
autonomy is plausibly a fundamental right even before we turn to the 
most recent case law. 
The second part of the traditional approach, we saw, is the demand 
for a “careful description” of the asserted right.  This brings us the other 
strand of the Court’s search for fundamental rights—the autonomy 
 
 51. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965). 
 52. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . shall not be violated . . . .”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV. 
 53. In the eighteenth century, Jefferson asserted that “the legitimate powers of government 
extend to such acts only as are injurious to others.”  Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, in 
JEFFERSON: HIS POLITICAL WRITINGS 36 (Edward Dumbauld ed., 1955).  In the nineteenth century, 
expanding Jefferson’s insight into his famous “harm principle,” Mill wrote that “the only part of the 
conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others.  In the part 
which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.  Over himself, over his own 
body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (G. Himmelfarb, 
ed., 1869)  (emphasis added).  In the twentieth century, Rawls wrote that “the equal basic liberties 
(include) the rights and liberties specified by the liberty and integrity (physical and psychological) 
of the person.”  JF, supra note 30, at 44 (emphasis added).   
 54. Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 480 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 55. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).  This is plain, for example, in 
tort and criminal law.  The protection against unwanted physical contact is reflected in such crimes 
as assault, battery, rape, and kidnapping, as well as in associated intentional torts like false 
imprisonment.  As the Tenth Circuit recently wrote, “nonconsensual sexual contact . . . by its very 
nature evinces a clear intention to disregard the victim’s dignity and bodily autonomy . . . .”  United 
States v. Austin, 426 F.3d 1266, 1275 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting McCann v. Rosquist, 185 F.3d 
1113, 1120 (10th Cir. 1999)).  For centuries, thus, the common law has provided redress for 
invasion of bodily autonomy.  It is even protected in unintentional torts like negligence and strict 
liability. 
 56. Schloenforff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (1914).  
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss1/8
13_CARCIERI_WESTERN.DOCM 2/10/2011  2:04 PM 
2011] OBAMA, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE DRUG WAR 315 
strand, embodied in Lawrence v. Texas,57 as it refines the careful 
description requirement.  While Lawrence created no fundamental 
rights, one scholar has observed that 
Lawrence emphasized . . . that the precise framing of a right ought not 
to be conflated with the narrowest and most concrete definition of the 
conduct the state seeks to punish; the appropriate level of generality 
may require a broader understanding of the asserted interest . . . . On 
the one hand, framing must not be overly narrow . . . . On the other 
hand, framing must not be so broad that the scope of substantive due 
process becomes limitless . . . . 58 
By these lights, bodily autonomy defined as control over the 
borders and contents of one’s body, particularly within the home,59 
measures up well under Lawrence.  It is not too broad, to begin, as it 
specifies concrete limits on the autonomy protected by the right.  It 
literally protects a private physical space within a private physical space.  
It is thus not nearly as broad as “autonomy” or “liberty” or “privacy” or 
“the pursuit of happiness.”60 
Conversely, bodily autonomy is not too narrow under Lawrence.  It 
does not, like Mallan and other cases, define the right at stake merely as 
smoking marijuana.  Lawrence, after all, was clear that the right at stake 
there was not simply that of engaging in sexual conduct.61  There is no 
fundamental right to smoke cigarettes either, but a sudden federal 
prohibition of tobacco would certainly be subject to strict scrutiny. 
On this preliminary basis, bodily autonomy is plausibly a 
fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Yet a key 
advantage to framing the right at stake in marijuana prohibition as bodily 
autonomy is that it is stated broadly enough to have substantial roots in, 
and thus draw meaningful guidance from, the Court’s leading relevant 
 
 57. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 58. Note, Last Resorts and Fundamental Rights: The Substantive Due Process Implications of 
Prohibitions on Medical Marijuana, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1985, 1987-88 (2005). 
 59. Justice Kennedy underscores this point, referring to “the most private of places, the 
home.”  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.  As Laurence Tribe describes Kennedy’s opinion, “the Court 
was protecting the right of adults to define for themselves the borders and contents of deeply human 
relationships.”  Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental Right That Dare Not 
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1915 (2004) (emphasis added).  While marijuana 
prohibition and anti-sodomy laws do not present identical constitutional questions, the concepts of 
“borders and contents” are useful in understanding the autonomy at stake in both. 
 60. See People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 133 (1972) (Kavanagh, J., concurring).   
 61. See 539 U.S. at 567. While Lawrence, to be sure, protected a relational autonomy, this 
certainly included a bodily autonomy, specifically, for Mr. Lawrence, the right to decide whether, in 
the privacy of the home, to have another man’s penis inside his body. 
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case law, especially that of liberty due process.  To reinforce the status 
of bodily autonomy as a fundamental right, rendering marijuana 
prohibition subject to strict scrutiny, we thus now turn to a brief review 
of that jurisprudence.  We shall take the cases according to the strength 
of the state interest asserted, beginning with those in which it is strongest 
and proceeding toward those in which it is weakest.  While no right 
except freedom of thought is absolute, the portrait that will emerge is 
that of a strong presumption in favor of liberty as bodily autonomy. 
2.  The Presumption in Favor of Bodily Autonomy 
Our starting point is the right to die cases, Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Dept. of Health62 and Glucksberg.  In Cruzan, a young woman 
was rendered vegetative in a car accident and eventually taken to a state 
hospital.63  Once it was apparent that she had virtually no chance of 
regaining her mental faculties, her parents asked employees of the 
hospital to terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration procedures 
keeping her alive.64  The employees refused to do so without court 
approval, and the case went to the Supreme Court.65 
On the one hand, the Court held, the State’s compelling interest in 
preserving life entitles it to require clear and convincing proof of a 
patient’s wish to discontinue life saving procedures before honoring that 
wish.66  On the other hand, assuming such proof is made, the Court 
affirmed the Fourteenth Amendment right of such a patient, based on his 
interest in bodily autonomy, to refuse the treatment.67  Quoting an old 
precedent, the Court observed that “no right is held more sacred, or is 
more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every 
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all 
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable 
authority of law.”68 
Glucksberg involved a State ban on physician-assisted suicide, even 
for terminally ill and suffering patients.69  Among the reasons for the 
ban, Washington asserted a compelling interest in preserving human 
 
 62. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 63. Id. at 266. 
 64. Id. at 267. 
 65. Id. at 268. 
 66. Id. at 262, 286. 
 67. Id. at 278. 
 68. Id. at 269 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).  
 69. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 702 (1997). 
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life.70  Writing for the Court, and grounding his decision in a historical 
and comparative analysis of the law of suicide, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
ruled for the State.71  He held that the individual right asserted was not 
fundamental and that the ban was subject to rational basis scrutiny, 
which it could satisfy.72  Yet three points are in order.  First, although it 
did not prevail in Cruzan, the interest in preserving human life, at least 
in the abstract, is the most compelling of all state interests.  All other 
public interests assume the preservation of human life, and so a State is 
on strong ground where it can plausibly assert this interest.  Second, a 
key reason Rehnquist rejected the right claimed in Glucksberg is that, 
unlike the right claimed in Cruzan, it amounted to a right to coerce a 
third person (doctor) to administer a lethal dose to a patient.73  Whatever 
else one thinks of this ruling, an adult’s liberty to consume marijuana in 
his home does not remotely involve such third party coercion.  
Concurring in Glucksberg, thirdly, Justice Stevens wrote that “in most 
cases, the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in his or her 
own physical autonomy, including the right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment, will give way to the state’s interest in preserving human 
life.”74  While the Glucksberg Court thus ruled for the State, Stevens 
expressly recognized the constitutionally protected status of bodily 
autonomy.75  This implies a different outcome where a law violates 
bodily autonomy yet government can claim no plausible interest in 
preserving life.  As we shall see, the state interests asserted in most 
bodily autonomy cases are not of this magnitude.  Whatever the weight 
of the State’s interest in preserving life in other circumstances, then, it is 
diminished in the case of a deeply comatose or terminal and suffering 
individual for the same reason and to the same degree as that 
individual’s interest in refusing lifesaving medicine is enhanced.76  Thus 
far, then, even when the state interest in invading bodily autonomy is 
strongest, the cases go both ways. 
 
 70. Id. at 703. 
 71. Id. at 702. 
 72. See id. at 734. 
 73. As the Chief Justice framed the issue, “the question before us is whether the “liberty” 
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself 
includes a right to assistance in doing so” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723. 
 74. Id. at 742 (Stevens, J., concurring); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S.Ct. 2293, 2306 (1997) (Stevens, 
J., concurring).  
 75. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 743 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 76. Id. at 743-44. 
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We come next to Jacobson v. Massachusetts,77 Schmerber v. 
California,78 and Winston v. Lee.79  In these cases, States asserted 
interests in preventing serious threats to, or punishing serious breaches 
of, public safety and welfare.  In Jacobson, a town required the 
inoculation of all residents against smallpox.80  Jacobson was fined when 
he refused to be inoculated, and he challenged this fine under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.81  In Schmerber, the 
petitioner had been in a car accident and appeared intoxicated to police 
when he arrived at a hospital.82  In order to preserve any evidence of his 
intoxication for purposes of prosecution, they directed a hospital 
employee to take a blood sample from Schmerber over his objection.83  
A blood sample analysis disclosing a high blood alcohol level was 
introduced against him at trial, and he objected on Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds.84 
The Court held for the State in both cases, and this is not surprising.  
For one thing, the state interest in invading bodily autonomy was 
compelling in both cases: smallpox was a fatal threat to public health 
and safety in 1905,85 and drunken driving remains so today.  For another 
thing, the degree of state intrusion into bodily autonomy was relatively 
limited in both cases.  A smallpox inoculation may be more intrusive 
than the extraction of blood, if only because something is being forced 
into the body rather than taken out.  Yet neither is on a par with the 
forced feeding of a comatose or terminal suffering patient.86  While 
 
 77. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
 78. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
 79. 470 U.S. 753 (1985). 
 80. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 13. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 759. 
        85.   Smallpox killed an estimated 60 million Europeans, including five reigning 
European monarchs, in the 18th century alone.  Up to 30% of those infected, including 
80% of the children under 5 years of age, died from the disease, and one third of the 
survivors became blind.  Smallpox was responsible for an estimated 300–500 million 
deaths in the 20th century.  As recently as 1967, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
estimated that 15 million people contracted the disease and that two million died in that 
year.  After successful vaccination campaigns throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, 
the WHO certified the eradication of smallpox in 1979.  To this day, smallpox is the only 
human infectious disease to have been completely eradicated from nature.   
N. Barquet & P. Domingo, Smallpox: The Triumph Over the Most Terrible of the Ministers of 
Death, in ANN. 127 INTERN. MED. 635, 635-42 (1997); Smallpox Factsheet, WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/smallpox/en/index.html. 
 86. Accord Niebla v. County of San Diego, No. 90-56302, 1992 US App LEXIS 15049 (9th 
Cir. June 23, 1992), in which a State’s interest in protecting a person from serious health problems 
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Jacobson and Schmerber are sound, then, they neither lessen the force of 
Cruzan nor control cases in which state interests are of a lesser 
magnitude than that in protecting and preserving life.87 
In Winston v. Lee, by contrast, the Commonwealth of Virginia 
claimed that a bullet lodged under Lee’s collarbone would help prove 
that he had committed an armed robbery.88  It thus sought a court order 
forcing him to undergo surgery to remove the bullet.89  The Supreme 
Court ruled, however, that Lee’s interest in avoiding invasive surgery 
outweighed the state interest in violating his bodily autonomy.90  While 
Virginia could claim a state interest on a par with those in Jacobson and 
Schmerber, thus, the gravity of Lee’s interest in avoiding the bodily 
intrusion in question far exceeded those in the earlier cases.  Because 
Virginia had other, if less incriminating, evidence with which to 
prosecute, it is not surprising that Lee prevailed.91  Thus far, once again, 
the cases go both ways, even where state interests are compelling. 
We come next to the abortion cases, in which States have claimed 
an interest in protecting potential human life.  Given the importance of 
preserving human life generally, Roe v. Wade92 and Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey93 took seriously the State interest in protecting fetal human life 
(and maternal health).  Nonetheless, Roe ruled for the individual, 
establishing a woman’s presumptive94 constitutional right to obtain an 
abortion.  Casey, in turn, reinforced the core of that right, expressly 
recognizing “the two more general rights under which the abortion right 
is justified: the right to make family decisions and the right to physical 
autonomy.”95  As in Winston, then, the principle of bodily autonomy 
prevailed in the abortion cases, even over substantial state interests. 
Thus far, we have reviewed cases involving important state 
interests.  Yet not all state interests are of this magnitude.  In City of 
 
by forced blood transfusion outweighed her interest in bodily autonomy.  This case involved a child, 
however.  Likewise, see Hanzel v. Arter, 625 F. Supp. 1259, 1266 (1985), which upheld an Ohio 
law requiring public school children to be immunized against specific diseases.   
 87. In Jacobson and Schmerber, it should be noted, the claim of governmental authority was 
based not on the federal commerce power, as with the CSA, but rather on the state police power. 
 88. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 753 (1985). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 767. 
 91. It is notable that Lee sought not to keep out of his body what he did not want, or even to 
put into his body what he did want, but to keep in what he wanted in. 
 92. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 93. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 94. As Roe, 410 U.S. at 155, 162-64, and Casey, 505 U.S. at 875-76 make clear, the abortion 
right is time-, place-, and manner-limited.   
 95. 505 U.S. at 884 (emphasis added). 
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Indianapolis v. Edmond,96 police had conducted suspicionless searches 
at highway roadblocks for the sole purpose of drug interdiction, and 
these were challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds.  In the past, the 
Court had spoken of a “fundamental public interest in implementing the 
criminal law.”97  Writing for the Edmond Court, further, Justice 
O’Connor called drug trafficking a serious problem.98  Nonetheless, she 
held that the state interest in drug interdiction is simply a species of the 
“general interest in crime control,”99 and thus could not justify the 
governmental action at issue. 
This is a key distinction, reiterated in later decisions.100  Whether or 
not they prevailed, the State interests asserted in Glucksberg, Cruzan, 
Jacobson, Schmerber, and Winston were all compelling interests, i.e., 
more substantial than the mere general interest in crime control.  By 
contrast, O’Connor is clear in Edmond that the while the State interest in 
drug interdiction may be legitimate, it is not compelling, and so would 
not satisfy strict scrutiny.101 
We come then to Rochin v. California.102  Here, police witnessed 
the defendant, in his bedroom, swallow two capsules they reasonably 
believed were illegal contraband.103  Unable to make him disgorge them, 
they took him to a hospital and had his stomach forcibly pumped in 
order to retrieve the evidence.104  As Justice Frankfurter wrote, such 
conduct “shocks the conscience,”105 violating the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.106  Forcible stomach pumping, of course, is a 
far greater bodily intrusion than is a forced inoculation or blood 
extraction.  Yet Rochin implicitly recognized what Justice O’Connor 
confirmed in Edmond—that the state interest in enforcing drug 
prohibition generally (and marijuana prohibition in particular) is far less 
 
 96. 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
 97. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 560-61 (1978).  
 98. It is notable, however, that she never distinguished cannabis from drugs like cocaine and 
heroin, and never spoke to whether state marijuana regulation would reduce rather than increase 
drug trafficking. 
 99. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44. 
 100. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 424 (2005); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 
424 (2004); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001). 
 101. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44. 
 102. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
 103. Id. at 166. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 172. 
 106. In Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Rochin for the proposition that “the “liberty” 
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes (the right) to bodily integrity . . . .” 521 U.S. 
702, 720 (1997). 
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substantial than that in preventing influenza or securing proof of drunk 
driving.  Under current U.S. law, thus, it is not a compelling interest. 
We come at last to cases in which government has no plausible 
interest, not even a legitimate one, in invading bodily autonomy.  In 
Griswold v. Connecticut,107 claiming an interest in preventing human 
conception,108 the State had banned the sale or use of contraceptive 
devices, even for married couples in the privacy of the home.109  By 
contrast to the abortion context, in which there is arguably a substantial 
state interest in protecting a human fetus,110 there is no such interest 
where conception has not yet occurred.111  Indeed, given the crisis of 
human overpopulation, there is no legitimate state interest in preventing 
conception, far less a compelling one.  If abortion or unwanted children 
are to be avoided, then available contraception for those who want it is 
not just sound public policy, it is urgent.  The Court thus quite 
reasonably invalidated the statute.112 
Finally, of course, we come to Lawrence v. Texas.113  Here, a state 
law had criminalized homosexual sodomy,114 even by consenting adults 
in the privacy of the home.115  Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy 
finessed the question whether the individual has a fundamental right for 
Fourteenth Amendment purposes to engage in such conduct.116  Yet this 
did not change the outcome, for even applying rational basis scrutiny, 
Kennedy wrote that “the Texas statute furthers no legitimate state 
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life 
of the individual.”117  As Professor Barnett has argued, Lawrence 
established a “presumption of liberty” where adults act peacefully in the 
privacy of their homes.118 
 
 107. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 108. Id. at 498. 
 109. Id. at 480. 
 110. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). 
 111. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. 
 112. See id. at 479.  Not all Justices in the majority joined Douglas’ reliance on “penumbras” 
from the Bill of Rights, yet all recognized the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as a 
source of the liberty at stake. 
 113. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 562-63. 
 116. See id. at 567; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) had held that no such 
fundamental right existed.  
 117.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 118. Randy Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, in CATO 
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 35-37 (2002-2003), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2003/ 
revolution.pdf. This is consistent with Rawls’ proviso that liberty may only be restricted for the sake 
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Summing up, States have prevailed in bodily autonomy cases 
where they have sought to protect post-natal life,119 prevent the spread of 
influenza,120 and secure essential proof of serious crimes.121  These 
rulings are consistent with Rawls’ equal liberty principle, which requires 
that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of 
liberty for all.”122  It is thus striking that, by contrast, even a state interest 
as strong as that in protecting fetal life mostly yielded to the individual 
liberty interest in the abortion cases.123  Accordingly, where a State’s 
interest in invading bodily autonomy is weak or nonexistent, e.g., in 
preventing conception (Griswold),124 punishing private consensual adult 
sodomy (Lawrence),125 or punishing the ingestion of drugs in the privacy 
of the home (Rochin),126 the Court held for the individual. 
Like most liberties, bodily autonomy is not absolute.  Yet we can 
now see that the President would have ample reason to agree that the 
cases we have reviewed, forming “a coherent constitutional view over 
the whole range of (the Court’s) decisions,”127 reflect a strong 
 
of liberty.  See TJ, supra note 24, at 186-93.  It is noteworthy that the Eighteenth Amendment, 
which banned the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating beverages, did not ban their 
consumption.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. Such an omission implies the drafters’ recognition 
that criminalizing ingestion would run so afoul of basic constitutional values as to risk a failure of 
ratification if it were included in the amendment. 
 119. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 120. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 13 (1905).. 
 121. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758 (1966). 
 122. TJ, supra note 24, at 220 (emphasis added). 
 123. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 124. See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 125. 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).  Let us not overlook that the liberty interest burdened by 
marijuana prohibition is strikingly parallel to that which prevailed in Lawrence.  Both cases deal 
with the liberty of adults, not children, to decide what, in the exercise of autonomy and the pursuit 
of happiness, shall be taken into the most private of all places, their bodies, in the second most 
private of all places, their homes.  On the latter point, the Court has written, “the Court since the 
enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed the ‘overriding respect for the sanctity of the 
home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic’.”  Oliver v. U. S., 
466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1979)). See also Kelo 
v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  Given the weak governmental interest in marijuana 
prohibition, then, and the strong individual interest burdened by such prohibition, President Obama 
would be inclined to conclude that it is unconstitutional under Edmond and Lawrence alone. 
 126. As Justice Frankfurter wrote, “due process of law requires an evaluation based on a 
disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science on a balanced order of facts exactly and 
squarely stated, on the detached consideration of conflicting claims, . . . on a judgment not ad hoc 
and episodic, but duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of change in a 
progressive society.”  Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
 127. John Rawls, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 235 (1993).  
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presumption of liberty as bodily autonomy.128  Using this presumption as 
a guidepost in assessing the constitutionality of marijuana prohibition, 
he is already inclined to bring a skeptical eye to arguments in its 
favor.129 
C. Complementary Theses 
I have argued that marijuana prohibition is subject to strict scrutiny 
because bodily autonomy, which marijuana prohibition burdens, is a 
fundamental right.  I now turn to three arguments which reinforce one or 
both parts of this, my core jurisprudential thesis. 
1.  Justice as Regularity 
The central command of the equal protection principle is that 
government may not treat differently those who are similarly situated.130  
Rawls calls this “justice as regularity,”131 and as the Court wrote in a 
seminal case, “[w]hen the law lays an unequal hand on those who have 
committed intrinsically the same quality of offense . . . it has made as 
invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or 
nationality for oppressive treatment.”132  More recently, it has observed, 
“[o]ur cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought 
by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that she has been 
 
 128. By contrast, Obama knows that isolated cases like Gonzales v. Raich, which reject 
longstanding precedent, see Carcieri, supra note 20, at 1136-46, lack the legitimacy of the Court’s 
recognition, over the course of many years and many cases, of the presumption of liberty as bodily 
autonomy.  In passing, the President would reject any claim that, since the laws on the books are 
often not enforced, the administration of U.S. marijuana prohibition does not violate due process.  
As he understands, when law enforcement officials have complete discretion whether to enforce the 
criminal law, this invites them to engage in the arbitrary, discriminatory treatment, often based on 
race, that violates due process. 
 129. De Marneffe writes that “a person who is not free to use drugs for recreation is not 
thereby denied due process of law.”  Peter de Marneffe, Do We Have a Right to Use Drugs? 10 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY 229, 235 (1996) (emphasis added).  Because I do not apply strict 
scrutiny to marijuana prohibition, I do not technically refute this claim.  Yet de Marneffe makes this 
assertion in passing, and so he does not remotely undermine my showing that the leading relevant 
liberty due process cases establish a presumption of bodily autonomy.  Even more telling, de 
Marneffe later concedes that “I am inclined to support not only marijuana decriminalization, but 
marijuana legalization as well.”  DOUGLAS HUSAK & PETER DE MARNEFFE, THE LEGALIZATION OF 
DRUGS: FOR AND AGAINST 180 (2005). 
 130. Since perfection can never be the standard for human institutions like government, this 
rule must be understood as forbidding substantially dissimilar treatment for those who are 
substantially similarly situated. 
 131. See TJ, supra note 24, at 207-08. 
 132. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 
194 (1964) (emphasis added). 
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intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that 
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”133  Obama 
would thus take very seriously the principle that those with similar cases 
must be treated similarly.  Just as the state violates this principle when it 
treats individuals arbitrarily based on race, it violates it where it imposes 
a greater punishment on one person than it does on another for the same 
or a lesser offense.134 
Now we saw that there is substantial evidence that marijuana use is 
less harmful than the use of alcohol and tobacco.135  Under current law, 
then, it is not just that marijuana users are similarly situated to drinkers 
and smokers, yet differently treated.  The imbalance is greater than this, 
for far from posing as much risk to genuine state interests as those who 
drink and smoke, especially in public, private adult marijuana users pose 
far less.  Yet the latter are subject to criminal punishment while the 
former are not.  The President would be inclined to agree that such a 
stark inconsistency is irrational and fundamentally unfair.136 
2.  Marijuana Prohibition and Suspect Classifications 
Beyond this, secondly, we have seen that strict scrutiny is triggered 
under the Fourteenth Amendment not only when a law burdens a 
 
 133. Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); See also Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-
Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) and Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).  This principle, 
Judge Posner has observed, is a basic element of the economic theory of law: “To count as law, a 
command … must treat equally those who are similarly situated in all respects relevant to the 
command.”  RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 393 (1972).  Stated differently, 
punishment for an exercise of liberty, to be rational, must be commensurate with the risk and/or 
harm that that exercise of liberty actually poses to legitimate or compelling state interests.  See, e.g., 
Douglas Husak, Do Marijuana Offenders Deserve Punishment?, in POT POLITICS: MARIJUANA AND 
THE COSTS OF PROHIBITION 195-96 (Mitch Earleywine ed., 2007). 
 134. As Rawls rightly notes, the “similarly situated/differently treated” formulation does not 
take us very far.  See TJ, supra note 24, at 207-09.  Standing alone, that is, it is not an argument, but 
rather a label encapsulating an assertion of an equal protection violation.  Like the harm principle 
with regard to liberty, it provides only a starting point or roadmap for constitutional argument 
regarding equality. 
 135. See supra note 50. 
 136. John Lovell, a lobbyist for the California Peace Officers’ Association and opponent of 
Tax Cannabis 2010 asks, “what good comes of it? . . . .  What is the good of adding another mind-
altering substance?”  Dave Ferrell, Weed Takes Root, SAN FRANCISCO WEEKLY, Jan. 6, 2010.  The 
answer is that Mr. Lovell simply ignores the equality dimension of constitutional law.  He is trying, 
in Rawlsian terms, to privilege the good over the right.  The state, however, cannot simply declare 
that it will punish some exercises of liberty but not others on grounds that some liberty is bad 
enough, and more would be worse.  If those who exercise one liberty pose a lesser threat of harm to 
legitimate public interests than others, then the consistency at the heart of equal protection requires 
that they be punished no more than those others.  Otherwise, there is little to stop a state from 
punishing, e.g., only one race for drinking alcohol or only one gender for smoking.   
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fundamental right, but also when it uses a “suspect classification.”137  
Race is the paradigm suspect classification, we saw, and the drug war’s 
disparate impact on racial minorities in all phases of the criminal justice 
system is well documented.138  Yet even if Obama had doubts that such 
an impact embodies a suspect classification, he would find it hard to 
disagree that U.S. marijuana prohibition has long been motivated largely 
by racism.  As Bonnie and Whitebread write, for example, based on their 
“brief survey of marijuana prohibition in the western states, we have 
concluded that its Mexican use pattern was ordinarily enough to warrant 
its prohibition, and that whatever attention such legislative action 
received was attended by sensationalist descriptions of crimes 
committed by Mexican marijuana users.”139 
As Sloman adds: 
“the first users of marijuana—that is, the first people to smoke 
cannabis for mostly recreational purposes—were members of minority 
groups . . . .  [S]tate after state enacted some form of prohibition 
against the non-medical abuse of the drug.  California in 1915, Texas 
in 1919, Louisiana in 1924, New York by 1927—one by one most 
states acted, usually when faced with significant numbers of Mexicans 
or Negroes using the drug.”140 
As Booth elaborates: 
“the press and ‘concerned citizens’ took up the call, driven not only by 
their zeal but also by their anti-Mexican attitudes, which were 
strengthened during the Depression when jobs were scarce and 
migrants seemed to be stealing work from the white work force.  The 
Mexicans were accused, without any justification, of spreading 
marijuana across the nation.  State marijuana laws were often used as 
an excuse to deport or imprison innocent Mexicans . . . .”  
Although they had been using marijuana for years, it was not until 
1938 that [Federal Bureau of Narcotics Director Harry] Anslinger finally 
came to realize the link between jazz musicians and the drug . . . . Once 
the association dawned on him, he set about going after the 
entertainment industry in general and jazz musicians specifically.  They 
 
 137. See supra note 31. 
 138. See supra note 7. 
 139. Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread II, “The Genesis of Marijuana Prohibition—
Rationale in the West:  Class Legislation,” in The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An 
Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REV. 971, 1016 
(1970), available at http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/library/studies/vlr/vlr2.htm. 
 140. Larry “Ratso” Sloman, Reefer Madness: A History of Marijuana 29-30 (1979). 
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fitted nicely into his racist agenda: if they were not black, they were 
whites who had come under and been corrupted by black influence . . . .  
What had been considered a drug threat during the two world 
wars—the German and, before and between the conflicts, the Chinese—
was now replaced by colored men, this jingoism heightened not only 
because of the immigration situation but also by the American cant put 
out since the 1930s by Anslinger and the FBN.  Concern was not only 
voiced about the fate of women in black hands: there was a worry that 
the young might also come under their spell, this given credence by the 
arrest, in August 1951, of the first white teenager found in possession of 
marijuana.  Cannabis, the black man’s narcotic, was widely regarded as 
more dangerous than heroin or cocaine, not because of its potential for 
addiction but for its facilitation of multi-racial sexual 
communication.”141 
Beyond the drug war’s racially disparate impact, then, there is 
evidence that racism has long been a dominant motive behind U.S. 
marijuana prohibition.  Obama is thus justified in concluding not only 
that it burdens a fundamental right, but also that it embodies a suspect 
classification.  He would thus likely agree that all roads of Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis lead to a presumption against, i.e., strict scrutiny 
of, marijuana prohibition. 
3.  Bodily Autonomy and Free Speech 
Finally, while I have argued that my thesis has broad support in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it is reinforced by the analogy between bodily 
autonomy and free speech. Rawls expressly includes both speech and 
“the physical integrity of the person” among the basic liberties protected 
by the equal liberty principle.142  Moreover, neither speech nor bodily 
autonomy is a zero sum liberty.143  Unlike some forms of affirmative 
action, for example, involving scarce, valuable resources, free speech 
 
 141. MARTIN BOOTH, CANNABIS: A HISTORY 178-79, 207, 229-30 (2003).  As one writer 
observes, “Anslinger’s appeal to racism and hysteria was unabashed.”  Michael Vitiello, 
Proposition 215: De Facto Legalization of Pot and the Shortcomings of Direct Democracy, 31 U. 
MICH. J. L. REFORM 707, 749 (1998) (citing Richard L. Miller, THE CASE FOR LEGALIZING DRUGS 
(1991)). Beyond interracial sex, Anslinger associated marijuana with deviant sex, insanity, and 
communism.  See Schlosser, supra note 14, at 20.  See also Milton Friedman, There’s No Justice in 
the War on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1998; Monroe Anderson, It’s Time to Legalize Marijuana 
in Illinois, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Nov. 12, 2006. 
 142. See TJ, supra note 24, at 53; JF, supra note 30, at 44. 
 143. A situation is characterized as zero-sum where “one side’s gain in every transaction is the 
other side’s loss.”  John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 734 (1984).  
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and bodily autonomy are not denied to some simply because extended to 
others.  While free speech is not absolute, then, the Court has come to 
recognize the strongest of presumptions in its favor.144  Given the 
analogy between bodily autonomy and free speech, two doctrines in 
particular are illuminating. 
The first is that of commercial speech.  In Rubin v. Coors Brewing 
Co.145 and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,146 the Court held that 
laws banning ads giving the public accurate information about retail 
prices of alcoholic beverages violate the First Amendment.  As great a 
threat as such ads intuitively pose to public health and safety, that is, 
government cannot prove that a given ad will proximately cause, e.g., 
domestic violence or a fatal car crash.147  Because liquor can be legally 
purchased and consumed by adults, moreover, even in public, the Court 
reinforced the presumption of liberty—even in the case of liquor ads.148  
On this basis, Obama would be skeptical that private adult marijuana 
use, unlike liquor ads, will proximately cause harms of the magnitude of 
domestic violence or a fatal auto collision. 
The second doctrine is that of incitement to imminent lawlessness, 
the rule for which is stated in Brandenburg v. Ohio.149  There, a man was 
convicted under a state criminal syndicalism statute for remarks he had 
made at a Ku Klux Klan rally.150  In striking the law down, the Court 
held that government may punish incitement to imminent lawlessness 
only where it can show that the speech in question is both (1) directed 
toward producing serious imminent harm to others and (2) likely to do 
so.151  Two points are in order. 
First, this rule recognizes the distinction, reflected elsewhere in free 
speech law,152 between (1) the exercise of liberty and (2) its likely, 
immediate, harmful effects on third parties, the latter being necessary to 
 
 144. As Justice Douglas observed, “free speech is the rule, not the exception.” Dennis v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  See generally KATHLEEN M. 
SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW ch.1 (3d ed. 2007).   
 145. 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
 146. 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
 147. See Rubin, 514 U.S. 476; Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484. 
 148. See id. 
 149. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 150. Id. at 444-45. 
 151. Id. at 447. 
 152. Examples include the law of bribery, fraud, obscenity, criminal conspiracy, and criminal 
solicitation.  See generally Gunther and Sullivan, supra note 144, ch.1. 
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ban or punish the former.153  In light of the speech/bodily autonomy 
analogy, then, the law governing bodily autonomy should reflect this 
distinction as well.  Before government can punish private adult 
marijuana use, that is, it should have to prove, and not merely assert, any 
substantial harms immediately caused by that exercise of liberty.  If 
private adult marijuana use causes no such harms, then it should no more 
be punishable based on what may happen afterward than consumption of 
alcohol can be punished based on the drunken driving that may later take 
place. 
Beyond this, secondly, application of the Brandenburg rule to 
private adult marijuana use suggests that punishing this exercise of 
liberty is even harder to justify than suppression of speech.  Whatever 
harms, if any, private adult marijuana use is likely to cause others, it 
would be very difficult to show that it is directed to causing such harm.  
Even a speaker at a public rally who desires and advocates that public 
buildings be blown up is constitutionally protected if there is no 
imminent threat that anyone will do as he says.154  In this light, Obama 
would recognize the absurdity of any claim that private adult marijuana 
users, in exercising their liberty, have any comparable malicious, 
destructive intent.155 
In sum, the parallel between bodily autonomy and free speech 
reinforces the President’s basis for concluding that marijuana prohibition 
is subject to strict scrutiny.156 
 
 153. Professor Sunstein, President Obama’s “Regulatory Czar,” has referred to “real danger of 
public injury” as necessary to overcome the right to bear arms.  See Cass Sunstein, The Most 
Mysterious Right, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 19, 2007, at 42, 47. 
 154. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Although it concerns a state constitutional privacy clause, a line of Hawaii Supreme Court 
cases provides further authority for this claim.  As Mallan notes, the Hawaii Supreme Court has 
taken two approaches to interpreting Article I, section 6 of the Hawaii Constitution.  The first 
approach, the Mueller/Baehr approach, tracks the traditional approach to substantive due process of 
Palko and Glucksberg, identified by Professor Post, supra note 40.  The second approach is the 
Stanley/Kam approach, through which Article I, section 6 establishes a fundamental right where an 
individual views or reads pornographic material in his home.  See Hawaii v. Mallan, 86 HAW. 440, 
443-45 (1998).  The court held that the combination of “the home as the situs of privacy” and the 
fact that “freedom of speech and freedom of the press are strongly implicated” yielded a 
constitutionally protected right.  Id. at 444-45.  Insofar as bodily autonomy is, like free speech, a 
zero sum liberty, and since we are focused on the activities of adults in the privacy of the home, 
Stanley/Kam provides doctrinal authority to reinforce the strong presumption against laws 
burdening the bodily autonomy of adults in the privacy of the home. 
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III.  CONCLUSION:  TOWARD RATIONAL AND JUST POLICY REFORM 
Beyond its economic, social, and other constitutional difficulties, I 
have argued, marijuana prohibition is subject to strict scrutiny under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  I have supported this primarily by showing that 
(1) bodily autonomy, which is directly burdened by marijuana 
prohibition, is plausibly a fundamental right, and (2) the Court’s leading 
relevant case law has established a presumption in its favor.  I have 
endeavored to reinforce my thesis, further, by arguing that (1) marijuana 
prohibition violates “justice as regularity,”157 (2) its racist origins satisfy 
the suspect classification trigger of strict scrutiny, and (3) given the 
analogy between free speech and bodily autonomy, the strong 
presumption in favor of free speech should apply to bodily autonomy. 
As noted, the application of strict scrutiny to marijuana prohibition 
is the subject of another article, and indeed, complex litigation.  Yet I 
submit that Obama would have grave doubts that this prohibition could 
pass an honest application of that rule.  As a stark matter of precedent, 
an adult woman has a limited right to expel a fetus from her body158 and 
an adult man has a right in his home to have another man’s penis inside 
his body.159  Both, moreover, have the right to eat, drink and smoke 
themselves to death, even in public, contributing to serious social 
problems like drunken driving, second hand smoke, and burdens on the 
health care system.  In this light alone, the President would find it hard 
to identify a principled basis in equality or liberty for denying those 
adults the right to consume marijuana in their homes. 
Beyond constitutional law, finally, three key ideas in Rawls—
legitimate expectations, public reason, and overlapping consensus—
provide the President an even broader foundation for challenging 
Congress to end this war.  I conclude with them. 
As for the first, Rawls writes that it is not the satisfaction of moral 
desert, but rather legitimate expectations, that characterize a just 
distributive scheme under a sound contract theory.160  From his 
viewpoint as a citizen, then, while knowing he cannot expect perfection 
from human institutions like government, the average person can 
legitimately expect that the law will not be so irrational and inconsistent 
as to criminalize the exercise of one liberty while other liberties, far 
 
 157.  TJ, supra note 24, at 207-08. 
 158.  See Roe v. Wade, 510 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 159. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 160. See TJ, supra note 24, at 273-77. 
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more harmful, are merely regulated for reasons widely understood.161  
From their viewpoints as citizens (and not merely economic agents), 
those who profit from or are employed by the alcohol, tobacco, 
pharmaceutical, and prison industries have no legitimate expectation that 
private adult marijuana use will forever remain a crime simply so that 
their profits and employment will be maintained.  The social contract of 
a reasonably just society, one worth passing onto their grandchildren, 
would never include such a provision. 
As for public reason, we have seen that Obama can give powerful 
justifications for ending marijuana prohibition, justifications which those 
in a constitutional democracy can accept in their capacity as citizens.162  
We have seen, that is, that the President has support not only in policy 
terms of cost/benefit analysis but also on constitutional grounds.  To be 
sure, authoritarian conservatives like William Bennett, 163 George 
Will,164 Lou Dobbs165 and John Walters166 may never change their 
minds, having declared the war on marijuana one in which we can never 
surrender.  Yet some are incapable of public reason.  As Freeman writes, 
“there is no presumption that Social Darwinists, fundamentalists, neo-
Nazis, or Southern slaveholders would be amenable to public reason, nor 
should any effort be made to accommodate their views.”167  Moreover, 
these drug warriors do not speak for all conservatives.  Beyond such 
persistent voices as those of William F. Buckley and Milton Friedman, 
for example, the heroic dissents of Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist and 
Thomas in Gonzales v. Raich show that some conservatives’ principled 
commitment to federalism overcomes any misgivings they have about 
liberal social policy.168 
Yet let us even assume that all social conservatives are strongly 
inclined toward marijuana prohibition.  Unanimity is not needed for 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 212-53 (1993). 
 163. See William Bennett, No Retreat, No Surrender; President Bush Signals a Renewed 
Offensive on Several Fronts in the Languishing War on Drugs, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May 
20, 2001, at G1. 
 164. See George Will, This War is Worth Fighting, WASH. POST, June 16, 2005, at A29.   
 165. See Lou Dobbs, A War Worth Fighting, THE WASH. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2003, at A12. 
 166. See John P. Walters, No Surrender: the Drug War Saves Lives, NAT’L REV., Sept. 27, 
2004. 
 167. Samuel Freeman, Introduction, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 40 (S. 
Freeman ed., 2003). Moreover, sweeping claims that marijuana must be illegal because it is 
immoral and undermines excellence contradict Rawls’ fundamental principle that in a just society, 
the right is prior to the good.  See TJ, supra note 24, at 288-89.   
 168. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 43-75 (O’Connor, Rehnquist, and Thomas, JJ., 
dissenting). 
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reform, and whatever their differences, the hard left, moderate left, and 
moderate right all value individual liberty, particularly autonomy in the 
privacy of the home.  In Rawlsian terms, there is substantial overlapping 
consensus here, building by the day.169  It will be even stronger if any of 
the states with current plans for Proposition 19-like initiatives in 2012 
enact them into law, and if the President can use his political skills and 
capital in his second term to convince those conservatives who respect 
cost/benefit analysis and constitutional principle.  As the President 
knows, some of them do. 
By 2013, I conclude, support for ending federal marijuana 
prohibition will have reached a tipping point.  Since Congress will not 
lead on this issue, it will have to follow. 
  
 
 169. See supra notes 5-6. 
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